The very nature of this conversation of gestures requires that the attitude of the other is changedthrough the attitude of the individual to the other's stimulus. In the conversation of gestures ofthe lower forms the play back and forth is noticeable, since the individual not only adjustshimself to the attitude of others, but also changes the attitudes of the others. The reaction of theindividual in this conversation of gestures is one that in some degree is continually modifying thesocial process itself. It is this modification of the process which is of greatest interest in theexperience of the individual. He takes the attitude of the other toward his own stimulus, and intaking that he finds it modified in that his response becomes a different one, and leads in turn tofurther changes
Fundamental attitudes are presumably those that are only changed gradually, and no oneindividual can reorganize the whole society; but one is continually affecting society by his ownattitude because he does bring up the attitude of the group toward himself, responds to it, andthrough that response changes the attitude of the group. This is, of course, what we areconstantly doing in our imagination, in our thought; we are utilizing our own attitude to bringabout a different situation in the community of which we are a part; we are exerting ourselves,bringing forward our own opinion, criticizing the attitudes of others, and approving ordisapproving. But we can do that only in so far as we can call out in ourselves the response ofthe community; we only have ideas in so far as we are able to take the attitude of the communityand then respond to it.
I have been presenting the self and the mind in terms of a social process, as the importation of theconversation of gestures into the conduct of the individual organism, so that the individualorganism takes these organized attitudes of the others called out by its own attitude, in the formof its gestures, and in reacting to that response calls out other organized attitudes in the others inthe community to which the individual belongs. This process can be characterized in a certainsense in terms of the "I" and the "me," the "me" being that group of organized attitudes to whichthe individual responds as an "I."
What I want particularly to emphasize is the temporal and logical pre-existence of the socialprocess to the self-conscious individual that arises in it.  The conversation of gestures is a partof the social process which is going on. It is not something that the individual alone makespossible. What the development of language, especially the significant symbol, has renderedpossible is just the taking over of this external social situation into the conduct of the individualhimself. There follows from this the enormous development which belongs to human society,the possibility of the prevision of what is going to take place in the response of other individuals,and a preliminary adjustment to this by the individual. These, in turn, produce a different socialsituation which is again reflected in what I have termed the "me," so that the individual himselftakes a different attitude.
Consider a politician or a statesman putting through some project in which he has the attitude ofthe community in himself. He knows how the community reacts to this proposal. He reacts tothis expression of the community in his own experience--he feels with it. He has a set of organized attitudes which are those of the community. His own contribution, the "I" in this case,is a project of reorganization, a project which he brings forward to the community as it isreflected in himself. He himself changes, of course, in so far as he brings this project forwardand makes it a political issue. There has now arisen a new social situation as a result of theproject which he is presenting. The whole procedure takes place in his own experience as well asin the general experience of the community. He is successful to the degree that the final "me"reflects the attitude of all in the community. What I am pointing out is that what occurs takesplace not simply in his own mind, but rather that his mind is the expression in his own conduct ofthis social situation, this great co-operative community process which is going on.
I want to avoid the implication that the individual is taking something that is objective andmaking it subjective. There is an actual process of living together on the part of all members ofthe community which takes place by means of gestures. The gestures are certain stages in theco-operative activities which mediate the whole process. Now, all that has taken place in theappearance of the mind is that this process has been in some degree taken over into the conductof the particular individual. There is a certain symbol, such as the policeman uses when hedirects traffic. That is something that is out there. It does not become subjective when theengineer, who is engaged by the city to examine its traffic regulations, takes the same attitude thepoliceman takes with reference to traffic, and takes the attitude also of the drivers of machines.We do imply that he has the driver's organization; he knows that stopping means slowing down,putting on the brakes. There is a definite set of parts of his organism so trained that under certaincircumstances he brings the machine to a stop. The raising of the policeman's hand is the gesturewhich calls out the various acts by means of which the machine is checked. Those various actsare in the expert's own organization; he can take the attitude of both the policeman and the driver.Only in this sense has the social process been made "subjective." If the expert just did it as achild does, it would be play; but if it is done for the actual regulation of traffic, then there is theoperation of what we term mind. Mind is nothing but the importation of this external processinto the conduct of the individual so as to meet the problems that arise.
This peculiar organization arises out of a social process that is logically its antecedent. Acommunity within which the organism acts in such a co-operative fashion that the action of oneis the stimulus to the other to respond, and so on, is the antecedent of the peculiar type oforganization we term a mind, or a self. Take the simple family relation, where there is the maleand the female and the child which has to be cared for. Here is a process which can only go onthrough interactions within this group. It cannot be said that the individuals come first and thecommunity later, for the individuals arise in the very process itself, just as much as the humanbody or any multi-cellular form is one in which differentiated cells arise. There has to be alife-process going on in order to have the differentiated cells; in the same way there has to be asocial process going on in order that there may be individuals. It is just as true in society as it isin the physiological situation that there could not be the individual if there was not the process ofwhich he is a part. Given such a social process, there is the possibility of human intelligencewhen this social process, in terms of the conversation of gestures, is taken over into the conductof the individual--and then there arises, of course, a different type of individual in terms of theresponses now possible. There might conceivably be an individual who simply plays as the childdoes, without getting into a social game; but the human individual is possible because there is asocial process in which it can function responsibly. The attitudes are parts of the social reaction;the cries would not maintain themselves as vocal gestures unless they did call out certainresponses in the others; the attitude itself could only exist as such in this interplay of gestures.
The mind is simply the interplay of such gestures in the form of significant symbols. We mustremember that the gesture is there only in its relationship to the response, to the attitude. Onewould not have words unless there were such responses. Language would never have arisen as aset of bare arbitrary terms which were attached to certain stimuli. Words have arisen out of asocial interrelationship. One of Gulliver's tales was of a community in which a machine wascreated into which the letters of the alphabet could be mechanically fed in an endless number ofcombinations, and then the members of the community gathered around to see how the lettersarranged after each rotation, on the theory that they might come in the form of an Iliad or one ofShakespeare's plays, or some other great work. The assumption back of this would be thatsymbols are entirely independent of what we term their meaning. The assumption is baseless:there cannot be symbols unless there are responses. There would not be a call for assistance if
there was not a tendency to respond to the cry of distress. It is such significant symbols, in thesense of a sub-set of social stimuli initiating a co-operative response, that do in a certain senseconstitute our mind, provided that not only the symbol but also the responses are in our ownnature. What the human being has succeeded in doing is in organizing the response to a certainsymbol which is a part of the social act, so that he takes the attitude of the other person whoco-operates with him. It is that which gives him a mind.
The sentinel of a herd is that member of the herd which is more sensitive to odor or sound thanthe others. At the approach of danger, he starts to run earlier than the others, who then followalong, in virtue of a herding tendency to run together. There is a social stimulus, a gesture, if youlike, to which the other forms respond. The first form gets the odor earlier and starts to run, andits starting to run is a stimulus to the others to run also. It is all external; there is no mentalprocess involved. The sentinel does not regard itself as the individual who is to give a signal; itjust runs at a certain moment and so starts the others to run. But with a mind, the animal thatgives the signal also takes the attitude of the others who respond to it. He knows what his signalmeans. A man who calls "fire" would be able to call out in himself the reaction he calls out inthe other. In so far as the man can take the attitude of the other--his attitude of response to fire,his sense of terror--that response to his own cry is something that makes of his conduct a mentalaffair, as over against the conduct of the others.  But the only thing that has happened here isthat what takes place externally in the herd has been imported into the conduct of the man. Thereis the same signal and the same tendency to respond, but the man not only can give the signal butalso can arouse in himself the attitude of the terrified escape, and through calling that out he cancome back upon his own tendency to call out and can check it. He can react upon himself intaking the organized attitude of the whole group in trying to escape from danger. There isnothing more subjective about it than that the response to his own stimulus can be found in hisown conduct, and that he can utilize the conversation of gestures that takes place to determine hisown conduct. If he can so act, he can set up a rational control, and thus make possible a far morehighly organized society than otherwise. The process is one which does not utilize a manendowed with a consciousness where there was no consciousness before, but rather an individualwho takes over the whole social process into his own conduct. That ability, of course, isdependent first of all on the symbol being one to which he can respond; and so far as we know,the vocal gesture has been the condition for the development of that type of symbol. Whether itcan develop without the vocal gesture I cannot tell.
I want to be sure that we see that the content put into the mind is only a development and productof social interaction. It is a development which is of enormous importance, and which leads tocomplexities and complications of society which go almost beyond our power to trace, butoriginally it is nothing but the taking over of the attitude of the other. To the extent that theanimal can take the attitude of the other and utilize that attitude for the control of his ownconduct, we have what is termed mind; and that is the only apparatus involved in the appearanceof the mind.
I know of no way in which intelligence or mind could arise or could have arisen, other thanthrough the internalization by the individual of social processes of experience and behavior, thatis, through this internalization of the conversation of significant gestures, as made possible by theindividual's taking the attitudes of other individuals toward himself and toward what is beingthought about. And if mind or thought has arisen in this way, then there neither can be nor couldhave been any mind or thought without language; and the early stages of the development oflanguage must have been prior to the development of mind or thought.
1. According to this view, conscious communication develops out of unconsciouscommunication within the social process, conversation in terms of significant gestures out ofconversation in terms of non-significant gestures; and the development in such fashion ofconscious communication is coincident with the development of minds and selves within thesocial process.
2. The relation of mind and body is that lying between the organization of the self in its behavioras a member of a rational community and the bodily organism as a physical thing.
The rational attitude which characterizes the human being is then the relationship of the wholeprocess in which the individual is engaged to himself as reflected in his assumption of theorganized roles of the others in stimulating himself to his response. This self as distinguishedfrom the others lies within the field of communication, and they lie also within this field. Whatmay be indicated to others or one's self and does not respond to such gestures of indication is, inthe field of perception, what we call a physical thing. The human body is, especially in itsanalysis, regarded as a physical thing.
The line of demarcation between the self and the body is found, then, first of all in the socialorganization of the act within which the self arises, in its contrast with the activity of thephysiological organism (MS).
The legitimate basis of distinction between mind and body is be tween the social patterns and thepatterns of the organism itself. Education must bring the two closely together. We have, as yet,no comprehending category. This does not mean to say that there is anything logically against it;it is merely a lack of our apparatus or knowledge (1927) .
3. Language as made up of significant symbols is what we mean by mind. The content of ourminds is (1) inner conversation, the importation of conversation from the social group to theindividual (2) . . . . imagery. Imagery should be regarded in relation to the behavior in which itfunctions (1931).
Imagery plays just the part in the act that hunger does in the food process (1912).
1. Mead's major articles can be found in: Andrew J. Reck (ed.), Selected Writings: GeorgeHerbert Mead (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964).
2. The volumes were: The Philosophy of the Present (1932); Mind, Self, and Society (1934);Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century (1936); and The Philosophy of the Act (1938).An excellent brief introduction to Mead's social psychology can be found in an editedabridgement of his works: Anselm Strauss (ed.), The Social Psychology of George HerbertMead (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956). The major critical work dealing withMead's position is: Maurice Natanson, The Social Dynamics of George H. Mead (Washington,D.C. Public Affairs Press, 1956) .
3. Several varieties of Symbolic Interactionism exist today; cf., Manford Kuhn, "Major Trends inSymbolic Interaction Theory," Sociological Quarterly, 5 (1964), 61-84; and Bernard Meltzer andJohn W. Petras, "The Chicago and Iowa Schools of Symbolic Interactionism," in T. Shibutani(ed.), Human Nature and Collective Behavior: Papers in Honor of Herbert Blumer (EnglewoodCliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970). The best known variety of symbolic interactionism today isrepresented by the position of Mead's student Herbert Blumer; cf., Herbert Blumer, "SociologicalImplications of the Thought of George Herbert Mead," American Journal of Sociology, 71(1966), 534-544; and Herbert Blumer, Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1969). For a variety of studies done by members of thisschool, see: Arnold Rose (ed.), Human Behavior and Social Processes (Boston: HoughtonMifflin, 1962); J. G. Manis and B. N. Meltzer (eds.), Symbolic Interaction: A Reader in SocialPsychology (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967); and Gregory P. Stone (ed.), Social Psychologythrough Symbolic Interaction (Waltham, Mass.: Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970). Numerous moderntheoretical approaches also owe a great debt to the work of Mead, for example, Walter Coutu,Emergent Human Nature: A New Social Psychology (New York: Knopf, 1949) .
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