From Marvin E. Olsen, Dora G. Lodwick, and Riley E. Dunlap.Viewing the World Ecologically. Boulder, CO: Westview Press,1992. (Chapter 2, "Theoretical Framework," pp. 13-32.)
Thus far, we have referred to worldviews as "mental lenses," orcognitive and perceptual maps that we continually use to find our waythrough the social landscape surrounding us. Let us explore thisconcept in greater detail.
Worldviews are extremely encompassing in content and pervasive inadherence. The dominant worldview in the culture of a societynormally pertains to the totality of human existence and most aspectsof social life. Virtually everything that we experience is shaped bythe perceptions provided by our view of the world. Since the dominantworldview is generally held by most members of that society, itnormally establishes the culturally accepted definitions of socialreality.
In addition to the dominant worldview prevailing in asociety--such as the Industrial Worldview in contemporary Westernnations--there may also be one or more alternative worldviews--suchas an emerging Post-Industrial Worldview. An alternative worldview isobviously not held by a majority of the members of the society,although its adherents normally think that it should be. For thosewho hold that alternative worldview, nevertheless, it encompasses thetotality of human existence.
As discussed earlier, our worldview is learned throughsocialization and social interaction, and is constantly beingreinforced by the culture of our society throughout our lifetime. Weunconsciously and uncritically take our worldview for granted as "theway things are." It therefore pervades and influences most of ourthinking and actions; it is not often questioned or doubted; and itis rarely altered in any significant way. Over time, however,worldviews do very slowly change.
Most people like to think that their view of the world isrelatively unified, and they often go to great lengths to interpretwhatever happens in ways that are consistent with their worldview.For example, if they believe that political leaders generally attemptto serve the public interest, when they observe a leader actingdishonestly they are likely to excuse his actions as "doing the besthe could under the circumstances" rather than alter their belief byaccepting the fact that political leaders sometimes act in their ownpersonal self-interest.
When discrepancies between observed events and people's worldviewbecome too blatant to be ignored or excused, however, individualsfrequently incorporate inconsistent beliefs and values into theirworldview without becoming unduly concerned about the resultingcontradictions. If a political leader's lying becomes too flagrant tobe ignored or excused, for instance, people may stop trying toreinterpret those events and instead view them as functionallynecessary. Their worldview might then incorporate the belief thatpublic deception is necessary for "national security." Consequently,people's worldviews often contain numerous incongruencies. In spiteof this strong resistance to change, under some circumstancesindividuals do occasionally convert from one worldview to another. Asimplied by the term "convert," this normally involves a totaltransformation of the way in which a person views the world.Similarly, the dominant worldview prevailing in the culture of asociety may through time become altered in major ways, so thateventually it represents an entirely new view of reality. When thatoccurs, it can have vast repercussions on most aspects of social lifeand completely change the culture and social structure of thatsociety.
As mentioned previously, world views are composed of beliefs orbelief systems and the social value associated with them. Acomprehensive worldview will normally incorporate a wide variety ofboth these components. To understand worldviews, therefore, we mustexamine the beliefs/belief systems and the social values that theycontain. A belief is a specific idea about some aspect of lifethat its holders are convinced is true, regardless of anydisconfirming evidence. For example, some people today still believethat the world is flat, despite photographs of a round earth takenfrom space. A recent survey of college students in the United Statesfound that over one-third of them believe that ghosts exist, andtwo-fifths of them believe that it is possible to communicate withthe dead (Eve 1988). More significant for social life are beliefsabout categories of people, such as the ideas that blacks arementally inferior to whites or that all poor people are personallyresponsible for their condition because of their unwillingness tohold a steady job. A belief that is central to the IndustrialWorldview sketched in Chapter 1 is that sooner or later technologicaldevelopments will always provide solutions to critical economic orsocial problems. A belief that is central to the alternativePost-Industrial Worldview is that all forms of life, including humanbeings, are integral parts of the world ecosystem and are bound bythe natural laws of that system.
A belief system is asset of interrelated beliefs dealingwith a broad social condition or type of activity. It is thereforemore extensive and complex than any of the specific beliefs includedwithin it. The specific beliefs composing a belief system tend toform a more-or-less integrated whole, although that system maydisplay numerous internal inconsistencies. A belief system that wasvery popular during the early part of this century, known as SocialDarwinism, held that social life is a continual struggle for survivaland dominance, marked by never-ending competition. The most competentand hard-working individuals tend to be successful in thiscompetition, while people who are losers in life are generallyincompetent and/or inferior. Consequently, socioeconomic inequalityis both natural and justified, and all efforts to reduce inequalitythrough public programs are unwarranted and bound to fail (Hofstadter1955).
Another belief system that is much older, and has createdconsiderable public controversy, is Creationism. Based on a literalinterpretation of the Bible, it holds that human beings were createdin their present form within the past 10,000 years, so that alltheories about the biological evolution of homo sapiens overseveral million years are false. Human beings are a unique form oflife, are specially favored by the Creator, and have a divine mandateto rule over all other life forms. This belief system is clearlyantithetical to a Post-Industrial Worldview, which holds that humanbeings are inexorably part of nature.
Specific beliefs are the building blocks of a worldview, andbelief systems provide its central framework. A total worldview ismuch broader and more encompassing than any particular belief orbelief system, however. Whereas a belief such as the existence ofghosts or a belief system such as Creationism is limited to someportion or aspect of life, a worldview covers much or all of humanexistence. A worldview therefore contains countless beliefs andbelief systems, some of which may be tightly interrelated whileothers may be unrelated or even contradictory to one another. Theworldview of Islam, for instance, includes not only a belief systemabout the origin of human life, but also beliefs and belief systemsabout interpersonal relationships, family life, economic activities,the political state, human rights, and the overall meaning andpurpose of life.
In general, we tend to be much more aware of our beliefs andbelief systems than we are of our worldview. We normally choose--atsome level of intentionality, if not always rationality--to adopt ourbeliefs and belief systems, and we sometimes choose to modify orreject them. In contrast, our worldview is such a fundamental andencompassing framework perceiving and interpreting social life thatit is simply taken for granted most of the time.
Closely associated with most of our beliefs and belief systems aresocial values concerning what is good and bad, or desirableand undesirable, in social life. Whereas a belief or belief system isa statement of what we think is (such as the belief thatfossil fuel reserves are finite) a social value is an expression ofhow we think things should be (such as the prescription thatwe should use renewable energy sources as much as possible). Beliefand values are usually closely linked. For instance, if we believethat the benefits a person receives in life are a result ofindividual efforts and accomplishments, we are quite likely to valuecompetition for jobs and income. Conversely, if we believe thatpoverty is largely a consequence of discrimination and exploitation,we will undoubtedly value social policies aimed at eliminating thosepractices.
Much current writing equates paradigms with worldviews, eventhough they are not equivalent concepts. Moreover, it is important todistinguish between scientific and social paradigms. Since theconcept of paradigms was first applied to scientific work, let usexamine it in that context before dealing with its applicability tosocial life.
The concept of scientific paradigms was popularized byThomas Kuhn (1970) to explain the manner in which science operatesand develops through time. A scientific paradigm is an intellectualperspective that, under normal conditions, guides the work of thosescientists who constitute a "scientific community" within aparticular discipline. In the words of Robert Friedrichs (1970:55), ascientific paradigm is "the intellectual image a discipline has ofits subject matter."
This intellectual perspective defines what constitutes "normalscience" within a scientific community at a given time and underliesmost of the theorizing and research done by its practitioners. Itincludes explicit and implicit assumptions about the nature of thephenomena being studied, prevailing beliefs and theories about thestructure and functioning of those phenomena, formal and informalrules concerning the manner in which they are to be studied, andstandards for evaluating the adequacy and validity of all scientificendeavors within that scientific community. As expressed by GeorgeRitzer (1975:7):
A paradigm is a fundamental image of the subjectmatter within a science. It serves to define what should be studied,what questions should be asked, how they should be asked, and whatrules should be followed in interpreting the answers obtained. Theparadigm is the broadest unit of consensus within a science andserves to differentiate one scientific community (or subcommunity)from another.
Without a scientific paradigm to guide, integrate, and interprettheir work, scientists create only random information. With ascientific paradigm, they can formulate theories that organizeknowledge and give it meaning. In Kuhn's (1970:16-17) words: "Nonatural history can be interpreted in the absence of at least someimplicit body of intertwined theoretical and methodological beliefthat permits selection, evaluation, and criticism."
Although Kuhn and many subsequent historians of science havelimited their discussions of paradigms to science, the concept ofparadigms is also applicable to most other realms of knowledge. Infact, Kuhn derived the idea of paradigms from the fields of historyand literature and applied it to science, demonstrating the extent towhich scientific thinking is influenced by nonscientific beliefs andvalues.
If the concept of paradigm is indeed applicable to all realms ofintellectual endeavor, it seems reasonable to presume that it canalso be applied to the ways in which people think about variousaspects of social life. Since the 1970s, several sociologists havebeen doing this. Stephen Cotgrove (1982) has contrasted the "DominantParadigm" with an "Alternative Ecological Paradigm" in his discussionof shifting worldviews. Riley Dunlap and Kent Van Liere (1978, 1983)have argued that a "new environmental paradigm" (NEP) underliescontemporary environmentalism, and contrasted it with the "dominantsocial paradigm" (DSP). And Lester Milbrath (1984) has discussed"contrasting belief paradigms in modern society."
In this study we use the concept of social paradigm torefer to the perceptual and cognitive orientation that a"communicative community" uses to interpret and explain particularaspects of social life that are important to it. A socialparadigm is therefore more restricted than a worldview in twoimportant ways. First, a social paradigm is held only by a limitedset of people and is not necessarily accepted by most members of asociety. We call this set of people a "communicative community"--analogous to the "scientific community" that holds a scientificparadigm--to indicate that there is enough ongoing, patternedcommunication among them to create a social paradigm. Second, asocial paradigm pertains only to certain aspects of life rather thanthe totality of social existence. Normally, those aspects are topicsthat are of particular concern to that communicative community andhence are objects of their communication.
In short, social paradigms are more limited in scope andacceptance than are prevailing worldviews, so that the culture of asociety is likely to contain many more social paradigms thanworldviews at any given time. Social paradigms are similar incomposition to worldviews, however, in that their principalcomponents are also beliefs/belief systems and the values associatedwith them. As expressed by Stephen Cotgrove (1982:26): "paradigmsprovide the framework of meaning within which 'facts' and experiencesacquire significance and can be interpreted. But they a normative aswell as a cognitive dimension, indicating not only what is but whatought to be." A social paradigm might therefore be described as a"mini-worldview" held by a communicative community.
Throughout this research we use the concepts of a TechnologicalSocial Paradigm and an Ecological Social Paradigm to refer to beliefsand values pertaining to the particular realms of social life we areprimarily investigating, while reserving the ideas of IndustrialWorldview and Post-Industrial Worldview for the broader ways ofviewing the totality of social reality in which those socialparadigms are assumed to be embedded.
The concept of ideologies is often used interchangeably witheither worldviews or paradigms in both everyday and social scientificdiscussions, and many writers make no effort to distinguish betweenthese closely related ideas. The principal reason for this conceptualconfusion is that ideologies are always derived from worldviews orsocial paradigms. An ideology is an argument derived from aworldview or social paradigm that a group of people purposefully useto justify their actions (Kinloch 1981). In other words, either aworldview or a social paradigm--but especially the latter--can beturned into an ideology by a set of people and intentionally used bythem to justify their activities. The common tendency to turn socialparadigms into ideologies is described by Stephen Cotgrove (1982:88)in the following manner:
Paradigms are not only beliefs about what the world islike and guides to action; they also serve the function oflegitimating or justifying courses of action. That is to say, theyfunction as ideologies. Those who do not share the paradigm willquestion the justification for the action it supports. Hence,conflict over what constitutes the paradigm by which action should beguided and judged to be reasonable is itself a part of the politicalprocess. The struggle to universalize a paradigm is part of thestruggle for power.
The reason for adopting and promoting an ideology is to explain,justify, and legitimate one's actions and/or goals. If people'sactions and goals can be linked with an existing worldview or socialparadigm by proclaiming those ideas as their ideology, whatever theydo is more likely to be accepted by others in the society. Anappealing ideology is particularly crucial when initiating a socialmovement to promote social change, since it serves to attractsupporters and justify the movement. Ideologies are also widely usedby established elites to explain and legitimate their exercise ofpower and control and their privileged status (Kinloch 1981).
Like the worldviews and social paradigms on which they are based,ideologies consist of beliefs/belief systems and values. When theseideas are proclaimed as an ideology, however, it is important thatthey be expressed in clear and simple terms that everyone canunderstand--and preferably in words that carry strong positiveemotional appeals. An ideology is also similar to a social paradigmin being held by a limited set of people, although its proponents arelikely to be fewer in number and more closely unified than acommunicative community. As already implied, however, when aworldview or social paradigm is transformed into an ideology, itdisplays two unique characteristics.
First, an ideology is intentionally formulated and propounded byits adherents for a specific purpose. Whereas the IndustrialWorldview appears to have emerged more-or-less spontaneously associeties became highly industrialized, and the Technological SocialParadigm developed gradually as technology became increasinglycentral to these societies, the ideology of market capitalism derivedfrom that worldview and social paradigm has intentionally beenpropounded by Western economic theorists and business leaders toexplain and justify a particular kind of industrial economic system.
Second, an ideology is used by its proponents for their ownpolitical purposes, which rarely occurs with worldviews or socialparadigms. A dominant worldview is normally an integral part of thetotal culture of a society and is simply accepted as the way thingsare. While a social paradigm is restricted to a communicativecommunity, those people tend to view it as an expression of normalconditions for them. In contrast, when a worldview or paradigm isconverted into an ideology by a set of people--dominant elites,leaders of a social movement, a powerful social class, an ethnicpopulation, or some other group--they purposely use it as a means ofsupporting and furthering their power, privileges, actions and goals.In short, an ideology is always a symbolic political weapon.
Karl Mannheim, the foremost student of ideology, identified twodifferent types of ideologies. Particular ideologies arecreated by specific sets of people to justify their predominantinterests and concerns, while total ideologies express theprevailing mode of thinking in a society or era (Mannheim 1936:56).Thus a particular ideology is normally derived from a specific socialparadigm, while a total ideology is generally an expression of abroad worldview that pervades an entire society and shapes thethinking of all its members. In this study, we use the concept of"ideology" in its narrower meaning, similar to Mannheim's "particularideologies."
Why do people create ideologies from worldviews and socialparadigms and proclaim them to be "the obvious truth?" A partialanswer to this question lies in the functions that ideologies performfor people. Three important functions of ideologies for individualsare providing meanings, simplifying existence, and creatingcertainty. These functions also pertain to worldviews and socialparadigms, although less explicitly than with ideologies.
An adequate ideology will give understandable meanings to allkinds of social events, activities, and trends that otherwise appearunintelligible. It places them within a frame of reference thatconstitutes a defined context which assigns meanings to them. Forexample, if we wonder why so much conflict is occurring in MiddleEastern nations today, our ideology can explain all of thoseincidents as part of the continuing struggle for "third-worldliberation" from "capitalistic imperialism."
An adequate ideology will also transform the diverse complexity ofsocial life into a simple and easily grasped theme. It does this byoffering an abstract but quite simplistic slogan or phrase that canbe applied to all kinds of difficult and complex situations. If webelieve that communism is an "evil empire," then whatever theU.S.S.R. does is seen as part of its attempts to spreadtotalitarianism throughout the world. On the other hand, if webelieve that communism is seeking to reduce socioeconomic inequality,then some of the actions of the U.S.S.R. seem more reasonable.
In addition, an adequate ideology gives its adherents the absolutecertainty that they--and only they--know the truth. Ideologies tendto be extremely intolerant of all other competing ways of thinking.For the believers in a particular ideology it is never just one ofseveral possible ways of viewing the world; it is the only possibletruth. Anyone who does not share their way of thinking is obviouslyuninformed or misguided or out of touch with reality. In the currentdebate over abortion, for instance, "right-to-life" proponents aretotally convinced that abortion violates the moral imperative thatall human life is sacred and must always be protected, so that"pro-choice" adherents are clearly morally misguided.
These functions performed by ideologies--and also commonly byworldviews and social paradigms--have been called by Peter Berger andThomas Luckmann "the social construction of reality," which theydescribe in the following manner (1966:67):
What is taken for granted as knowledge in the societycomes to be coextensive with the knowledge, or at any rate providesthe framework within which anything not yet known will come to beknown in the future. This is the knowledge that is learned in thecourse of socialization and that mediates the internalization withinindividual consciousness of the objectivated structures of the socialworld. Knowledge, in this sense, is at the heart of the fundamentaldialectic of society. It "programs" the channels in whichexternalization produces an objective world. It objectifies thisworld through language and the cognitive apparatus based on language.That is, it orders it into objects to be apprehended as reality.
To explain the process through which an established scientificparadigm is rejected in favor of emerging paradigm, Thomas Kuhn(1970) proposed the theory of paradigm shift. While Kuhnapplied this theory only to scientific paradigms, it is also quiterelevant to social paradigms. In this section, we firstoutline Kuhn's theory of scientific paradigm shift, and thendiscuss its application to social life.
This explanation of shifts in scientific paradigms begins with theobservation that all paradigms are mental creations, shaped andinfluenced by the knowledge existing at the time they arise. Asscientific ideas and findings change through time, anomaliesinevitably begin to appear that do not fit into the currentlyaccepted paradigm. New theoretical thinking and empiricalobservations begin to violate expectations and beliefs contained inthe prevailing paradigm, so that it becomes increasingly inconsistentlogically and incongruent with observed facts.
The initial reaction to those anomalies within a scientificparadigm is likely to be reaffirmation of the paradigm and denialthat there are any problems with it. The difficulties beingexperienced are attributed not to inadequacies in the paradigm, butrather to nonrigorous theorizing or invalid research findings.Scientists will tend to argue intensely over fine details of theirtheories and interpretations of their research findings, attemptingto fit all their ideas and data into the accepted paradigm in somemanner. They are not willing at that point to reject the establishedparadigm, since it defines their basic intellectual understanding oftheir field.
At most, members of that scientific community may be willing tomake minor modifications in their scientific paradigm in an effort tomake it more logically consistent or empirically congruent, but thosemodifications do not alter or deny the ultimate truth of theparadigm. "In science," wrote Kuhn (1970:64), "novelty emerges onlywith difficulty, manifested by resistance, against a backgroundprovided by expectations."
Anomalies within an existing scientific paradigm may be ignored orminimized or explained away for a considerable period of time,especially if they do not threaten core beliefs and principles ofthat paradigm. Sooner or later, however, the inadequacies of theparadigm will become so glaring that they can no longer be denied. Anintellectual/scientific crisis then erupts with which the existingscientific paradigm cannot cope. It becomes obvious to growingnumbers of scientists that the old paradigm must be discarded andreplaced with a new one that is more relevant to current knowledge.
No matter how serious that intellectual/scientific crisis becomes,however, the existing paradigm will not be discarded until a new oneis available to replace it. Scientists must have some paradigm withwhich to interpret their work. In science, as in all of life,observed Kuhn (1970:77),
the act of judgement that leads scientists to reject apreviously accepted theory is always based upon more than acomparison of that theory with the world. The decision to reject oneparadigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept another, andthe judgement leading to that decision involves the comparison ofparadigms with nature and with each other.
In some situations, the new paradigm may have already beenproposed by a few innovative thinkers who increasingly attractadherents to their way of thinking. In other situations, noalternative paradigm may be readily available, which leads to afrantic search for ideas and beliefs that can form the basis of a newscientific paradigm which can explain the observed anomalies.
The new paradigm that eventually emerges will not only befundamentally different from the old one, but incompatible with itbecause the two paradigms portray the world in quite distinct ways.Therefore, rational debate between advocates of the two competingparadigms will often be impossible. Each side in this debate willframe its arguments in terms of its own paradigm, and fail to realizethat its opponents are viewing the situation from an entirelydifferent perspective. Consequently, both sides will simply talk pastone another with little or no meeting of minds (e.g., Dunlap 1983).As Kuhn (1970:94) explained:
Like the choice between competing politicalinstitutions, that between competing paradigms proves to be a choicebetween incompatible modes of community life. Because it has thatcharacter, the choice is not and cannot be determined merely by theevaluative procedures characteristic of normal science, for thosedepend in part upon a particular paradigm, and that paradigm is atissue. When paradigms enter, as they must, into a debate aboutparadigm choice, their role is necessarily circular. Each group usesits own paradigm to argue in that paradigm's defense.
Since the choice between the old and new paradigms cannot be madeon rational grounds, a new paradigm is usually accepted primarilybecause people have faith in its ability to make sense of observedconditions--not because it offers immediate solutions to observedanomalies. "A decision between alternative ways of practicing scienceis called for, , and in the circumstances that decision must be basedless on past achievements than on future promises. . . . A decisionof that kind can only be made on faith" (Kuhn 1970:158).
The process of paradigm shift within a scientific community islikely to require a considerable amount of time during which there iscontinual conflict between adherents of the old paradigm and convertsto the new one. Kuhn (1970: 158- 159) describes the process in thefollowing manner:
Rather than a single group conversion, what occurs isan increasing shift in the distribution of professional allegiances.At the start, a new candidate for paradigm may have few supporters .. . . Nevertheless, if they are competent, they will improve it,explore its possibilities, and show what it would be like to belongto the community guided by it. And as that goes on, if the paradigmis one destined to win its fight, the number and strength of thepersuasive arguments in its favor will increase. More scientists willthen be converted, and the exploration of the new paradigm will goon. Gradually the number of experiments, instruments, articles, andbooks based upon the paradigm will multiply. Still more men,convinced of the new view's fruitfulness, will adopt the new mode ofpracticing normal science, until at last only a few elderly holdoutsremain.
When a shift from an old to a new paradigm within a scientificcommunity is complete, a scientific revolution will have occurred. Inthe first several decades of the twentieth century, as Einstein'sparadigm of a physical universe based on relativity replaced the oldNewtonian paradigm based on absolutes, the entire discipline ofphysics was totally transformed. "The transition from a paradigm incrisis to a new one is a reconstruction of the field from newfundamentals, a reconstruction that changes some of the field's moreelementary theoretical generalizations . . . ." (Kuhn 1970:84-85). Inshort, a scientific paradigm shift is always a total intellectualrevolution. ''When paradigms change, the world itself changes withthem" (Kuhn 1970:111).
In this study--as in many other recent writings discussed inChapter 4--we take the theory of paradigm change out of its originalscientific setting and use it to explain how social paradigms changewithin societies. Most of Kuhn's theory of scientific paradigm changeis fully relevant to social life, with two critical exceptions.
First, Kuhn describes the process of creating a new paradigm andarguing its merits as a relatively deliberate endeavor. Althoughadherents of the old and new paradigms may be talking past oneanother and hence not engaging in any kind of meaningful debate, eachside intentionally presents its arguments as rationally as possible.The process of establishing a new social paradigm within acommunicative community is rarely as intentional or rational as inscientific communities, however. Competing social paradigms are notusually as purposefully formulated or rationally expressed as arescientific paradigms. Nor are social paradigms publicly discussed ordebated in the same manner as occurs among scientists. Consequently,we argue that new social paradigms normally emerge unintentionally,are incompletely and vaguely expressed, and only gradually gainadherents as increasing numbers of people become aware of theanomalies within the old social paradigm.
The tendency for adherents of competing scientific paradigms to"talk past" one another and hence fail to communicate in anymeaningful way is even more pronounced with social paradigms becauseof their lack of clear formulation and rational expression. Thistendency is described by Stephen Cotgrove (1982:82) as a seriousproblem in modern societies:
The existence of alternative social paradigms mayresult in problems of communication and understanding of suchmagnitude that they threaten the legitimacy of the political system.It is because protagonists to the debate approach issues fromdifferent cultural contexts, which generate different and conflictingimplicit meanings, that there is mutual exasperation and charges andcounter charges of irrationality and unreason. What is sensible fromone point of view is nonsense from another. It is the implicitself-evident, taken-for-granted character of paradigms which clogsthe channels of communication. And, where belief in thereasonableness of the political system, and its openness to reasonedargument and debate, break down, the normal channels of petition,protest, and pressure group tactics come to be seen as inadequate.
Second, Kuhn uses the idea of anomalies within paradigms in twodifferent ways which are not explicitly distinguished. In somesituations, anomalies may be caused by internal logicalcontradictions within the structure of the paradigm, with the resultthat some components of it are inconsistent with other components.For instance, some of the values shared among adherents to a paradigmmay no longer fit with beliefs that are central to it. If peoplecontinue to adhere to the traditional belief that a married woman'sproper place is in the home, but also value the right of women tochoose their own life course, those values will likely come intoconflict with the traditional beliefs as more and more married womenpursue job careers.
In other situations, anomalies may be caused by externaldiscrepancies between the beliefs and values of the paradigm andexisting social conditions, with the result that some components areincongruent with reality. For instance, real-life conditions mightdirectly contradict some established paradigm beliefs. If the membersof a religious sect are firmly convinced that the world will end on aspecified day, the next morning they will likely experience a severediscrepancy between their religious convictions and reality. Kuhn maynot have thought it necessary to distinguish between these two kindsof anomalies because of the continual interplay between theoryconstruction and empirical research within the sciences. But suchlinkages between ideas and observations are much less systematic insocial life.
The existence of two different kinds of anomalies in socialparadigms suggests that there may be two distinct causes of changesin these beliefs and values. One of the principal research objectivesof this study, consequently, is to distinguish between internal andexternal causes--logical inconsistencies and experientialincongruencies--of paradigm changes. We seek to determine therelative importance of these two causes in the transition from aTechnological to an Ecological Social Paradigm, and thus attempt toclarify a critical aspect of Kuhn's paradigm change theory whenapplied to social paradigms. In that analysis, we always use theterms "contradictions" and "inconsistencies" to refer to internalcauses of anomalies, while the terms "discrepancies" and"incongruencies" are always used to refer to external causes ofanomalies in social paradigms.
An example of the kind of internal contradictions that maypresently be occurring within the old Technological Social Paradigmis continued acceptance of the belief that technological innovationwill eventually solve all of our current resource and energyproblems, coupled with values stressing the importance of protectingthe natural environment against further unnecessary exploitation anddesecration. Whether or not those values are inconsistent with theunderlying belief depends, of course, on the forms of futuretechnological developments. In regard to energy, for example, ifthose technological developments focused primarily on renewableenergy sources such as photovoltaic cells, they might be fullyconsistent with environmental preservation. Without such detailedspecification, however, uncritical faith in technology to solve theenergy problem is at least potentially in conflict with environmentalprotection values. Increasing awareness of this possible logicalinconsistency within the Technological Social Paradigm could causemany people to begin questioning that paradigm and consider adoptinga new paradigm that directly supports their environmental values.
An example of the kind of external discrepancies that may beoccurring within the Technological Social Paradigm would betraditional faith in the benefits of technology, coupled with growingawareness of the numerous risks posed by modern technologicaldevelopment. Most people have been taught throughout their lives thatmodern technology is quite safe and trustworthy. In recent years,however, numerous events have occurred that have cast serious doubtson that trust. These have ranged from "normal accidents" (Perrow1984) such as airplane crashes and oil spills to entirely unexpectedtechnological failures such as the Chernobyl nuclear plant explosionin the Soviet Union and the release of lethal fumes from a chemicalplant at Bhopal in India. As more and more of these technologicalaccidents occur, many people may begin to fear that they are beingexposed to serious technological risks over which they have nocontrol. This fear might cause them to reject their faith in moderntechnology and adopt a new Ecological Social Paradigm.
Another major research objective of this study is to determinewhether Kuhn's paradigm shift theory provides the most appropriatemodel for describing the process through which social paradigmschange, or whether an alternative model would provide a betterdescription of this process.
The model of change underlying Kuhn's (1970) paradigm shift theoryrepresents a two-stage disconnected process. When a paradigm shiftoccurs, according to this model, the new paradigm is largely orentirely unrelated to, and different from, the old paradigm. There islittle or no continuity between them, since the new paradigm totallyrejects and replaces the old one. The beliefs and values constitutingthe new paradigm represent a radically different way of seeing theworld.
That pattern of unconnected sequential paradigms may apply toscientific advancement, as claimed by Kuhn, but it does not appear tobe as relevant to social change. When a society changes from anagrarian to an industrial economy, for instance, it undergoes afundamental sociocultural transformation, but those two stages ofsocietal change are never unrelated. Many social institutions andcultural ideas from the agrarian era are carried forward into theindustrial era, at least for some period of time. Moreover, themanner in which that transformation occurs can significantlyinfluence the economic and political systems that exist in theindustrial stage, as Barrington Moore (1966) demonstrated in hisstudy of the origins of dictatorship and democracy in modernsocieties.
When the paradigm shift model is applied to the change from aTechnological to an Ecological Social Paradigm, it suggests thatthese two paradigms should be totally different and display nosociocultural continuities between them. Yet even a superficialexamination of these two social paradigms quickly reveals numerouslinkages and continuities. Consequently, the two-stage paradigm shiftmodel does not appear to be appropriate to describe the change fromone social paradigm to another.
An alternative model of the manner in which paradigms change isoffered by the dialectic process described by the nineteenth-centuryphilosopher G. W. F. Hegel (1942), which is a three-stage interactiveprocess. This model, which Karl Marx (1970) used to explain changesfrom one type of society to another, provides for continual interplayand critical linkages among its three stages of thesis, antithesis,and synthesis. In this section, we first sketch the dialectic model,and then discuss its relevance to changes among social paradigms.
The dialectic model begins with an initial thesis stage, or a setof sociocultural conditions that exist in a society at a given timeperiod. Within any existing set of sociocultural conditions, thereare always fundamental contradictions that create severe strains andtensions. These are not merely surface conflicts, but rather basicincompatibilities among various components of the existing system. Aclassic example in Marx's analysis of capitalism is "commodityfetishism," in which the functional uses of various commoditiesbecome largely obscured by people's desires to own those goods asstatus symbols, so that the market values of many items far exceedtheir true use values. This fundamental contradiction between use andmarket values of goods and services undermines a capitalist economyand constitutes a potential basis for its transformation (Heilbroner1980:102-105).
The contradictions occurring within any society may be ignored orstifled for a considerable length of time, provided that the rulingclass can exercise sufficient social control to prevent major socialchange, or if those segments of the society that are disadvantaged bythe contradictions remain unaware of them. Because thosecontradictions are inherent in the basic structure of the society,however, they never simply fade away. They can only be resolvedthrough fundamental change of the society. If and when such changesactually occur is determined by many interrelated factors, the mostimportant of which is organized collective action by disadvantagedgroups seeking to improve their living conditions. Nevertheless, allsocieties contain basic contradictions that are the seeds of theireventual transformation.
If that transformation does eventually occur within a society, thesecond stage of the dialectic process, or antithesis, is reached. Asthis term implies, the new sociocultural conditions are likely to bedirect negations of the conditions existing in the initial thesisstage. Consequently, they will not contain the fundamentalcontradictions that plagued the thesis stage and led to itstransformation. Nevertheless, the thesis and antithesis stages arealways historically and structurally linked, since the latter stagegrows directly out of the earlier stage and is essentially an attemptto resolve the contradictions of the earlier stage.
At the same time, the new sociocultural conditions of theantithesis stage will also contain their own fundamentalcontradictions, which are essentially mirror images of those in thethesis stage. Consequently, the antithesis stage, like the thesisstage, contains the seeds of its further transformation. Hence theprocess of sociocultural change continues.
The unique feature of the dialectic model lies in its third, orsynthesis, stage. If and when this stage is reached in a society, itis not merely an outgrowth of the antithesis stage. It is, rather, acombination and blending of both the thesis and antithesis stages. Itthus represents an integration or unification of the two precedingsets of sociocultural conditions. The initial contradictions thatexisted in the thesis stage and their opposite conditions thatexisted in the antithesis stage are all eliminated in the synthesisstage, which incorporates both earlier stages into a new form ofsociety. A society that reaches the synthesis stage is thus radicallydistinct from anything that previously existed. Nevertheless, it isalways inescapably linked with the past, since it rests on, and isderived from, both earlier stages. The process of dialectic socialchange therefore always displays considerable historical continuity.
In Marx's vision, communism was to be the eventual synthesis stageof societal development. Since it would not contain any of thefundamental contradictions that are inherent in capitalism, hepredicted that the dialectic process of change would cease withcommunism. That vision-- which was elaborated in greater detail by V.I. Lenin--was an outcome of their critique of capitalism, however,and is not a necessary part of the dialectic model. While thesynthesis stages resolves all of the previous contradictions existingin a society, it could very well contain its own, entirely new,contradictions. If so, it would then become another thesis stages,and the dialectic process would begin again in an endless successionof social changes.
When this dialectic model is applied to social paradigms, asproposed by Satterfield (1983), it suggests that changes among theseparadigms will differ in two critical ways from Kuhn's description ofparadigm shifts. First, when analyzing change among social paradigmswe must always conceptualize it as a three-stage process, and alwaysinclude at least three social paradigms in our analysis. Second,successive social paradigms will always incorporate components frompreceding paradigms and therefore display numerous historicallinkages and continuities. Each successive paradigm will build onprevious paradigms as well as alter them, rather than totallyrejecting the preceding paradigm.
More specifically, the anomalies and contradictions thatcharacterize a social paradigm at the thesis stage of the dialecticprocess will not only prepare a society for paradigm change, but willalso shape the new sociocultural conditions that emerge in theantithesis stage. Consequently, there will be numerous structural andcultural linkages between these two successive social paradigms. Theantithesis stage will also contain anomalies and contradictions thatwill likely be mirror images of those existing in the thesis stages,so that its problems will be different from-- but neverthelessrelated to--those of the preceding stage. The social paradigmrepresenting the antithesis stage will therefore be as prone tocrises and eventual transformation as the earlier paradigm.
If and when the society moves on to integrate its thesis andantithesis social paradigms into a new synthesis paradigm, that setof beliefs and values will incorporate ideas from both precedingstages, but integrate them into an entirely new and completelydifferent social paradigm. And although that new synthesis stage willthen become the thesis for another future dialectic process, itsrelative unity should give it considerable stability for some periodof time. Eventually, nevertheless, its own anomalies andcontradictions will begin to manifest themselves and push for anotherdialectic process of paradigm change.
In this study, we will seek to determine whether the paradigmshift model or the paradigm dialectic model provides a more relevantdescription of the process of change from a Technological SocialParadigm to an Ecological Social Paradigm in modern societies.
Eckburg and Hill (1979) have identified three different levels ofparadigms within Kuhn's writings. At the broadest level are"metaparadigms," or encompassing perspectives that a scientificcommunity shares with all scientists and with most other members ofits society. At a middle level of generality are the "disciplinematrixes" held by particular scientific communities. This term issomewhat misleading, however, since paradigms at that level arerarely shared by an entire scientific discipline. Every disciplinenormally contains several different communities of scientists, eachof which focuses on a specifically defined area of the field--such asnuclear physicists within the discipline of physics. Each of thesecommunities of scientists working on a common set of problems has itsown paradigm that defines the nature of "normal science" within thatarea. At the lowest level of generality are "exemplars," which arethe concrete scientific problems that are currently being addressedwithin a scientific community, together with their generally acceptedsolutions. These established problems and solutions are especiallyimportant in training graduate students to become members of thatscientific community. Such training ensures that the currentlyaccepted paradigm within that scientific community will betransmitted from one generation to the next.
In this book, we use the middle-level concept of scientificparadigm, referring to the intellectual perspective shared by themembers of an established scientific community toward their realm ofwork--although we transform that concept into social paradigms sharedby communicative communities. We focus on this level because it isthe most relevant to paradigms in social life. The broader level ofmetaparadigms is essentially equivalent to total worldviews, which isone reason why many writers confuse paradigms with worldviews. Thelower level of exemplars is quite useful in examining the structureof a scientific field, as done by Eckberg and Hill and a number ofother writers they discuss. That level of analysis is not relevant tosocial paradigms, however, since they rarely contain formalexemplars. In addition, this latter level of analysis does notexplain paradigm shifts, which always involve a complete redefinitionof reality. When a paradigm shift occurs within a scientificcommunity, all of its current exemplars are usually discarded andreplaced by other problems and solutions that are congruent with thenew scientific paradigm. The search for new exemplars is a result ofthe broader paradigm shift, not a cause of it.
